Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts by Elsea, Jennifer K.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL31262
Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal,





Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military,
and International Courts
Summary
Declaring it necessary to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed a Military
Order (M.O.) authorizing the trial by military commission of certain non-citizens.  The
order directs the Secretary of Defense to establish the procedural rules for the
operation of the military commissions convened pursuant to the M.O. The
Department of Defense is reportedly drafting regulations, but few details have been
released. In the meantime, there has been much discussion about the procedural
safeguards to be applied by the military commissions.  The chart that follows
compares selected procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in federal
criminal court with parallel protective measures in military general courts-martial,
military commissions as authorized under the Military Order of November 13, and,
as a possible benchmark of international standards, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.
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1Military Order, November 13, 2001 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism §1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal,
Military, and International Courts
Declaring it necessary to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed a Military
Order (M.O.) authorizing the trial by military commission of certain non-citizens.1
The order directs the Secretary of Defense to establish the procedural rules for the
operation of the military commissions convened pursuant to the M.O. The
Department of Defense is reportedly drafting regulations, but few details have been
released. In the meantime, there has been much discussion about the procedural
safeguards to be applied by the military commissions.  This report compares selected
procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in federal criminal court with
parallel protective measures in military general courts-martial, military commissions
as authorized under the Military Order of November 13, and, as a possible benchmark
of international standards, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Introduction
 The Constitution imposes on the government a system of restraints to provide
that no unfair law is enforced and that no law is enforced unfairly.  What is
fundamentally fair in a given situation depends in part on the objectives of a given
system of law weighed alongside the possible infringement of individual liberties that
system might impose.  In the criminal law system, some basic objectives are to
discover the truth, punish the guilty proportionately with their crimes, acquit the
innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, and prevent and deter further crime,
thereby providing for the public order.  Military justice shares these objectives in part,
but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the armed forces, serving the overall
objective of providing an effective national defense.  The equation for international
criminal law may also consider foreign policy elements as well as international law and
treaty obligations.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “no person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due process
includes the opportunity to be heard whenever the government places any of these
fundamental liberties at stake.  The Constitution contains other explicit rights
applicable to various stages of a criminal prosecution.  Criminal proceedings provide
both the opportunity to contest guilt and to challenge the government’s conduct that
may have violated the rights of the accused.  The system of procedural rules used to
conduct a criminal hearing, therefore, serves as a safeguard against violations of
constitutional rights that take place outside the courtroom.
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2Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)(aliens are entitled to due process of law).
3U.S. CONST. Art. VI (“[A]ll Treaties ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; ...”).
4See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (War Crimes Act).
5See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 (1987).
6For a brief explanation of the sources of the law of war, see generally Terrorism and the Law
of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before Military Commissions, CRS Report
RL31191 (updated Dec.  11, 2001).
The Bill of Rights applies to all citizens of the United States and all aliens within
the United States.2 However, the methods of application of constitutional rights, in
particular the remedies available to those whose rights might have been violated, may
differ depending on the severity of the punitive measure the government seeks to take
and the entity deciding the case.  The jurisdiction of various entities to try a person
accused of a crime could have a profound effect on the procedural rights of the
accused.  The type of judicial review available also varies and may be crucial to the
outcome.
International law also contains some basic guarantees of human rights, including
rights of criminal defendants and prisoners. Treaties to which the U.S. is a party are
expressly made a part of the law of the land by the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution,3 and may be codified through implementing legislation.4  International
law is incorporated into U.S. law.5 The law of war, a subset of international law,
applies to cases arising from armed conflicts (i.e., war crimes).6  It is unclear exactly
how the law of war applies to the current hostilities involving  non-state terrorists, and
the nature of the rights due to accused terrorist/war criminals may depend in part on
their status under the Geneva Conventions.  
The chart that follows identifies a selection of basic rights in rough order of the
stage in the criminal justice process where they might become most important.  The
text of the chart indicates some of the procedural safeguards designed to protect
these rights in different tribunals.  Recognizing that fundamental fairness relies on the
system of procedural safeguards as a whole rather than individual rules, the chart is
intended only as an outline to compare some of the rules different courts and tribunals
might use to safeguard certain rights. 
Federal Court
The federal judiciary is established by Article III of the Constitution and consists
of the Supreme Court and “inferior tribunals” established by Congress.  It is a
separate and co-equal branch of the federal government, independent of the executive
and legislative branches, designed to be insulated from the public passions.  Its
function is not to make law but to interpret law and decide disputes arising under it.
 Federal criminal law and procedures are enacted by Congress and housed primarily
in title 18 of the U.S. Code. The Supreme Court promulgates procedural rules for
criminal trials at the federal district courts.  These rules, namely the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Fed. R. Crim. P.)  and the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R.
Evid.), incorporate procedural rights that the Constitution and various statutes
CRS-3
7U.S. CONST. Preamble.
8 Id. art. I § 8, cls. 11-14 (War Power).
9 Id. art. II § 2, cl. 1.
10 Id. art. I § 8, cl. 14.
11 See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (How.) 65 (1857).
12 See WILLIAM WINTHROP, WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 48-49 (2d. ed.
1920)(describing courts-martial as instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-chief, to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein) (emphasis in original).
13 See chart, infra.
14 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
15 See 10 U.S.C. § 802. “In time of war” refers to war declared by Congress. United States
v. Averette, 17 USCMA 363 (1968).
16 See 10 U.S.C. § 818.
demand.  The chart cites relevant rules or court decisions, but makes no effort to
provide an exhaustive list of authorities.
General Courts-Martial
The Constitution, in order to provide for the common defense,7 gives Congress
the power to raise, support, and regulate the armed forces,8 but makes the President
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.9  Article III does not give the judiciary any
explicit role in the military, and the Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress’
power “[t]o Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces”10 is entirely separate from Article III.11  Therefore, courts-martial are not
considered to be Article III courts and are not subject to all of the rules that apply in
federal courts.12  Defendants are not able to appeal their courts-martial directly to
federal courts, but may seek relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus, although
review may be limited.
Although military personnel are “persons” to whom the Bill of Rights applies,
in the military context it might be said that discipline is as important as liberty as
objectives of military justice.  Also, the Constitution specifically exempts  military
members accused of a crime from the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury
indictment,13 from which the Supreme Court has inferred there is no right to a civil
jury in courts-martial.14   However, in part because of the different standards provided
in courts-martial, their jurisdiction is limited to those persons and offenses the military
has a legitimate interest in regulating.  Courts-martial jurisdiction extends mainly to
service members on active duty, prisoners of war, and persons accompanying the
armed forces in time of declared war,15 as well as certain violators of the law of war.16
 Congress regulates the armed forces largely through title 10 of the U.S. Code,
which contains as Chapter 47 the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
regulating the system of military courts-martial.  The Supreme Court has found the
CRS-4
17 10 U.S.C. § 836.
18 The rules are set forth in the Manual for Courts Martial (M.C.M.), established as Exec.
Order No. 12473, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 49 Fed. Reg 17,152, (Apr. 23,
1984).
19For a more in-depth discussion of military commissions, see CRS Report RL31191, supra
note  4.
20  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
21  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
22  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
23  Id. art. II.
24  The Articles of War were re-enacted at 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. as part of the UCMJ.
Although there is no case law interpreting the UCMJ as authorizing military commissions, the
relevant sections of the UCMJ, which recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of military
commissions to deal with “offenders or offenses designated by statute or the law of war,” are
essentially identical to the corresponding language in the Articles of War. See 10 U.S.C. §
821.
25  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
26See WINTHROP, supra note 3, at 831 (describing distinction between courts-martial and
military tribunals).
procedures Congress set through the UCMJ to provide adequate procedural
safeguards to satisfy constitutional requirements and the interest in maintaining a
strong national defense.  
Congress has delegated to the President the authority to make procedural rules
for the military justice system.17  The President created the Rules for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) and the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) pursuant to that
delegation.18  The comparison chart will cite provisions of the UCMJ and the
applicable rules, as well as Court of Military Appeals (CMA) opinions as applicable.
Military Commissions19
The Constitution empowers the Congress to declare war and “make rules
concerning captures on land and water,”20 to define and punish violations of the “Law
of Nations,”21 and to make regulations to govern the armed forces.22  The power of
the President to convene military commissions flows from his authority as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his responsibility to execute the laws
of the nation.23 Under the  Articles of War and subsequent statute,24 the President has
at least implicit authority to convene military commissions to try offenses against the
law of war.25  There is, therefore, somewhat of a distinction between the authority and
objectives behind convening military courts-martial and commissions.26  Rather than
serving the internally directed purpose of maintaining discipline and order of the
troops, the military commission is externally directed at the enemy as a means of
waging successful war by punishing and deterring offenses against the law of war.
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27 10 U.S.C. § 821.  Statutory offenses for which military commissions may be convened are
limited to aiding the enemy, 10 U.S.C. § 904, and spying, 10 U.S.C. § 906.
28  See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
29 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866)
(noting a servicemember “surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts”).  
30  10 U.S.C. § 836.
31  Id.
32 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1988). The
United States has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute.  See The Rome Statute of the
(continued...)
Jurisdiction of military commissions is limited to time of war and to trying
offenses recognized under the law of war or as designated by statute.27 While caselaw
suggests that military commissions could try U.S. citizens as enemy belligerents,28 the
Military Order of November 13, 2001 limits their jurisdiction to non-citizens.
As non-Article III courts, military commissions are not subject to the same
constitutional requirements that are applied in Article III courts.29 Congress has
delegated to the President the authority to set the rules of procedure and evidence for
military tribunals, applying “the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district court” insofar as
he considers it practicable.30 The rules “may not be contrary to or inconsistent with
the UCMJ.”31
 The United States  first  used  military commissions to try enemy belligerents
accused of war crimes during the occupation of Mexico in 1847, and made heavy use
of them in the Civil War.  However, no military commissions have been convened
since the aftermath of World War II.  Because of the lack of standards of procedure
used by military commissions, it is difficult to draw a meaningful comparison with the
other types of tribunals.  The comparison chart will cite the language of the M.O. as
a baseline for comparing the possible terrorist tribunals to other courts, supplemented
by language of the UCMJ expressly applicable to such tribunals and historical
precedent where it may be relevant.  It should be emphasized that the actual
procedures to be used have yet to be pronounced and that historical precedent is not
necessarily binding. The chart includes the column only to help analyze what might
be possible under current law.
The International Criminal Court
As mentioned above, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what procedural
safeguards are due under the  international law of war.  The Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials established by the Allies at the end of World War II provide some precedent;
however, advances in international human rights law probably make the procedural
rules then used obsolete for today’s trials.  Perhaps the most recent embodiment of
the requirements of the international law of war to try accused war criminals is to be
found in the procedures of the not-yet-operational International Criminal Court (ICC)
established by the Rome Statute.32  For this reason, the ICC will be included on the
CRS-6
32(...continued)
International Criminal Court, Selected Legal and Constitutional Issues, CRS Report,
RL30091 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
following chart as representative of international standards for comparison purposes
only.
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Selected  Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts
U.S. Constitution Federal Court General Courts-Martial Military Commissions Rome Statute of the ICC
Presumption of
Innocence 
“The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary, and its




Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
If the defendant fails to enter
a proper plea, a plea of not
guilty will be entered.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a).
Defendant is entitled to jury
instructions explaining that
guilt must be proved on the
evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt.
 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478 (1978).
Defendant is entitled to
appear in court without
unnecessary physical
restraints or other indicia of
guilt, such as appearing in
prison uniform, that may be
prejudicial to jury.
See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
U.S. 560 (1986).
If the defendant fails to enter
a proper plea, a plea of not
guilty will be entered.
R.C.M. 910(b).
 Members of court martial
must be instructed that the
“accused must be presumed to
be innocent until the
accused’s guilt is established
by legal and competent
evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 
R.C.M. 920(e).
The accused shall be properly
attired in uniform with grade
insignia and any decorations
to which entitled.  Physical
restraint shall not be imposed
unless prescribed by the
military judge.
R.C.M. 804.
Unclear.  Under M.O.
President first determines
there is “reason to believe”
person is or was a member of
al Qaeda, has engaged in acts
of international terrorism, or
has knowingly harbored such
a person.  
M.O. § 2.  
“Everyone shall be presumed
to be innocent until proven
guilty before the Court ....”




compelled in any criminal




made by defendant under
duress or without prior
Miranda warning are
inadmissible as evidence of
guilt in a criminal trial.  





Miranda warning are not
admissible as evidence.
 Art. 31, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
831.
The prosecutor must notify
Unclear.  The M.O. does not
require warning or bar use of
statements made during
military interrogation from
criminal proceedings.  
Art. 31(a), UCMJ bars
persons subject to it from
compelling any individual to
During an investigation, if
there is reason to believe a
person has committed a crime
under the jurisdiction of the
ICC, that person has the right
“[t]o remain silent, without
such silence being a
consideration in the
determination of guilt or
CRS-8
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Before a jury is allowed to
hear evidence of a defendant’s
confession, the court must
determine that it was
voluntarily given.
18 U.S.C. § 3501.
the defense of any
incriminating statements
made by the accused that are
relevant to the case prior to
the arraignment.  Motions to
suppress such statements must
be made prior to pleading.
Mil. R. Evid. 304.
make a confession, but art.
31(d) bars the use of
compelled statements only at
courts-martial.  
Art. 31, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
831.
innocence.”
Rome Statute Art. 54.
“Evidence obtained by means
of a violation of this Statute or
internationally recognized
human rights shall not be
admissible…”





“The right of the people to be
secure ... against
unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be
violated; no Warrants shall






searches and seizures may be
excluded in court. 
Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1938); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.
A search warrant issued by a
magistrate on a showing of
probable cause is generally
required for law enforcement
agents to conduct a search of
an area  where the subject has
a reasonable expectation of
privacy, including searches
and seizures of telephone or
other communications and
emissions of heat and other
phenomena detectable with
means other than human
senses.  
Katz v. United States, 389
“Evidence obtained as a result
of an unlawful search or
seizure ... is inadmissible
against the accused ...” unless
certain exceptions apply.  
Mil. R. Evid. 311.
“Authorization to search”
may be oral or written, and
may be issued by a military
judge or an officer in
command of the area to be
searched, or if the area is not
under military control, with
authority over persons subject
to military law or the law of
war.  It must be based on
probable cause. 
Mil. R. Evid. 315.
Interception of wire and oral
communications within the
United States requires judicial
application in accordance
with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 et
seq.
Not addressed in M.O.  “Evidence obtained by means
of a violation of this Statute or
internationally recognized
human rights shall not be
admissible ….”
Rome Statute Art. 69(7). 
CRS-9




American property by foreign
officials is admissible unless 
foreign police conduct shocks
judicial conscience or
participation by U.S. agents is
so substantial as to render the
action that of the United
States.
U.S. v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087
(9th Cir. 1995).
Mil. R. Evid. 317.
A search conducted by foreign
officials is unlawful only if
the accused is subject to
“gross and brutal treatment.”  
Mil. R. Evid. 311(c).
Assistance of
Effective Counsel 
“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the
right … to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”
Amendment VI. 
Defendants in criminal cases
have the right to
representation by an attorney
at all stages of prosecution. 
The defendant may hire an
attorney or, if  indigent, have
counsel appointed at the
government’s expense.  If two
or more co-defendants are
represented by one attorney,
the court must inquire as to
whether a conflict of interest
exists.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 44.
 Conversations between
attorneys and clients are
privileged.
Fed. R. Evid. 501
Procedures for ensuring
adequate representation of
The defendant has a right to
military counsel at
government expense.  The
defendant may choose
counsel, if that attorney is
reasonably available, and may
hire a civilian attorney in
addition to military counsel.  
Art 38, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
838.
Appointed counsel must be
certified as qualified and may
not be someone who has taken
any part in the  investigation
or prosecution, unless
explicitly requested by the
defendant. 




will be represented by
attorneys, but does not
explicitly provide for a
defendant’s right to retain
counsel of choice. 
Regulations are to provide for
qualifications of attorneys.  
M.O. § 4(c). 
 In some past military
tribunals, defendants were not
permitted to choose attorneys,
nor were there procedures to
avoid conflicts of interest. 
For example, the eight Quirin
defendants were not permitted
to choose counsel and seven
were represented by the same
attorney, although one of
them had betrayed the others
to the FBI.
“…the accused shall be
entitled… to have legal
assistance assigned by the
Court where the interests of
justice so require, and without
payment if the accused lacks
sufficient means to pay for it;
…”
Rome Statute Art. 67(1)(d).
“… the accused shall be
entitled … to communicate
freely with counsel of
accused's choosing ….”
Rome Statute Art. 67(1)(b).
CRS-10
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defendants are outlined at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3005 (capital cases)
and 3006A.
is honored.  
Mil. R. Evid. 502.
Right to Indictment
and Presentment 
“No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or
public danger ....”
Amendment V. 
Where the accused is in
danger of being subjected to
an infamous punishment if
convicted, he has the right to
insist that he shall not be tried
except on the accusation of a
grand jury.
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.
417 (1885); Fed. R. Crim. P.
7.
Jurors must be selected from a
fair cross section of the
community; otherwise, an
accused can challenge the
indictment.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq.
Once an indictment is given,
its scope may not be
increased. 




further grand jury process.)
The right to indictment by
grand jury is explicitly
excluded in “cases arising in
the land or naval forces.”
Amendment V
Whenever an offense is
alleged, the commander is
responsible for initiating a
preliminary inquiry and
deciding how to dispose of the
offense.
R.C.M. 303-06.
Does not apply to offenses
against the law of war.  
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
M.O. allows individuals to be
tried by military commission
once it is determined in
writing by the President that 
there is “reason to believe”the
accused is or was a member of
al Qaeda, has engaged in acts
of international terrorism, or
has knowingly harbored such
a person.  
M.O. § 2.
The Pre-Trial Chamber
conducts a hearing “to
determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish
substantial grounds to believe
that the accused committed
each of the crimes charged.
Based on its determination,
the Pre-Trial Chamber shall
confirm those charges in
relation to which it has
determined that there is
sufficient evidence; ... decline
to confirm those charges in
relation to which it has
determined that there is
insufficient evidence; ... or
adjourn the hearing and
request the Prosecutor to
[provide further evidence or
amend the charges] ....”
Rome Statute Art. 61.
Charges may be amended up






“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the
right…to be informed of the
Defendant is entitled to be
informed of the nature of the
charge with sufficiently
Charges and specifications
must be signed under oath
and made known to the
Not specifically addressed in
M.O.
“… the person shall be
provided with a copy of the …
charges…”
CRS-11
U.S. Constitution Federal Court General Courts-Martial Military Commissions Rome Statute of the ICC
nature and cause of the
accusation; …”
Amendment VI. 
reasonable certainty to allow
for preparation of defense. 
Cook v. United States, 138
U.S. 157 (1891).
accused as soon as
practicable. 
Art. 30, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
830.
“[C]harges of violations of the
law of war triable before a
military tribunal need not be
stated with the precision of a
common law indictment.”
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946).
Rome Statute Art. 61(3).
Right to be Present
at Trial 
The Confrontation Clause of
Amendment VI guarantees
the accused's right to be
present in the courtroom at
every stage of his trial.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337 (1970).
The language, history, and
logic of Rule 43 support a
straightforward interpretation
that prohibits the trial in
absentia of a defendant who is
not present at the beginning
of trial.
Crosby v. United States, 506
U.S. 255, 262 (1993); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 43. 
When defendant knowingly
absents himself from court
during trial, court may
“proceed with trial in like
manner and with like effect as
if he were present.”
Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 455 (1912).
The presence of the accused is
required during arraignment,
at the plea, and at every stage
of the court-martial unless the
accused waives the right by
voluntarily absenting him or
herself from the proceedings
after the arraignment or by
persisting in conduct that
justifies the trial judge in
ordering the removal of the
accused from the proceedings.
R.C.M. 801.
Not addressed.  M.O. does not
appear to contemplate trials in
absentia.
"The accused shall be present
during the trial."




“No ... ex post facto law shall
be passed.”
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
Congress may not pass a law
punishing conduct that was
not a crime when perpetrated,
increasing the possible
sentence for a crime, or
Courts-martial will not
enforce an ex post facto law,
including increasing amount
of pay to be forfeited for
specific crimes.
M.O. provides for trial of
individuals for “any and all
offenses triable by military
commission.” 




constitutes, at the time it takes
CRS-12
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reducing the government’s
evidentiary burden. 
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (3
U.S.) 386 (1798); Ex Parte
Garland, 4 Wall (71 U.S.)
1867.
U.S. v. Gorki, 47 M.J. 370
(1997).
place, a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.”
Rome Statute Art. 22.
Protection against
Double Jeopardy 
"… nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; …"
Amendment V.
Subject to “dual sovereign”
doctrine, that is, federal and
state courts may prosecute an
individual for the same
conduct without violating the
clause.
 Jeopardy attaches once the
jury is sworn or where there is
no jury, when the first
evidence is presented.  If the
trial is terminated after
jeopardy has attached, a
second trial may be barred in
a court under the same
sovereign, particularly where
it is prosecutorial conduct 
that brings about the
termination of the trial. 




See Wade v. Hunter, 336 US
684, 688-89 (1949). 
Art. 44, UCMJ prohibits
double jeopardy, provides for
jeopardy to attach after
introduction of evidence.
10 U.S.C. § 844.
General court-martial
proceeding is considered to be
a federal trial for double
jeopardy purposes.  Double
jeopardy does not result from
charges brought in state or
foreign courts, although
court-martial in such cases is
disfavored.
U. S. v. Stokes, 12 M.J. 229
(C.M.A. 1982).
Once military authorities have
turned service member over to
civil authorities for trial,
military may have waived
jurisdiction for that crime,
although it may be possible to
M.O. provides that a person
subject to the order must be
turned over to the Secretary of
Defense upon demand, and
reserves the authority to direct
the Secretary of Defense to
transfer control of such a
person to another
governmental authority.  If a
defendant before a U.S. court
is  removed for trial by
military tribunal for the same
conduct, double jeopardy
could become an issue. 
M.O. §§ 2(c), 7(e).
“No person who has been
tried by another court…shall
be tried by the Court with
respect to the same
conduct…”
“No person who has been
tried by another court ... shall
be tried by the Court with
respect to the same conduct
unless the proceedings in the
other court [were not properly
conducted].”
Rome Statute Art. 20 
CRS-13
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charge the individual for
another crime arising from
the same conduct.  
See 54 AM. JUR. 2D, Military
and Civil Defense §§ 227-28.
Speedy & Public
Trial 
“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public
trial, ....”
Amendment VI. 
“The purpose of the
requirement of a public trial
was to guarantee that the
accused would be fairly dealt
with and not unjustly
condemned. History had
proven that secret tribunals
were effective instruments of
oppression.” 
Estes v. State of Tex., 381
U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
Trial is to commence within
seventy days of indictment or
original appearance before
court.  
18 U.S.C. § 3161.
Closure of the courtroom
during trial proceedings is
justified only if 1) the
proponent of closure advances
an overriding interest likely to
be prejudiced; 2) the closure
is no broader than necessary;
3) the trial court considers
reasonable alternatives to
closure; and 4) the trial court
makes findings adequate to
support closure. 
See Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
In general, accused must be
brought to trial within 120
days of the preferral of
charges or the imposition of
restraint, whichever date is
earliest.
R.C.M. 707(a).
The right to a public trial
applies in courts-martial but
is not absolute. 
R.C.M. 806.
The military trial judge may
exclude the public from
portions of a proceeding for
the purpose of protecting
classified information if the
prosecution demonstrates an
overriding need to do so and
the closure is no broader than
necessary.
United States v. Grunden, 2
M.J. 116 (CMA 1977).
Military commissions are
exempt from statutory
requirements for speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3172.  
M.O. appears to suggest
possible indefinite detention
without trial or charge. 
M.O. §§ 1(e), 2(b), 4(a).
M.O. authorizes the Secretary
of Defense to establish rules
for the “conduct, closure of,
and access to proceedings”
that will protect information
that is classified or
“classifiable” pursuant to
executive order or otherwise
protected by law.
“... the accused shall be
entitled to a public hearing ...
“the accused shall be entitled
... to be tried without undue
delay; ....”





Due Process requires the
prosecution to prove the
defendant guilty of each
element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Defendant is entitled to jury
instructions clarifying that the
prosecution has the burden of
presenting evidence sufficient
to prove guilt beyond a
Members of court martial
must be instructed that the
burden of proof to establish
guilt is upon the government
and that any reasonable doubt
Unclear.  M.O. does not
establish standard of proof.  
“The onus is on the
Prosecutor to prove the guilt
of the accused ....
“In order to convict the
accused, the Court must be
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In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
reasonable doubt. 
Cool v. United States, 409
U.S. 100 (1978).
must be resolved in favor of
the defendant. 
R.C.M. 920(e).
convinced of the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable
doubt.”
Rome Statute Art. 66.
Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination 
“No person … shall be
compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against
himself…”
Amendment V. 
Defendant may not be
compelled to testify.  Jury may
not be instructed that guilt
may be inferred from the
defendant’s refusal to testify.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
Witnesses may not be
compelled to give testimony
that may be incriminating
unless given immunity for
that testimony.
18 U.S.C. § 6002.
No person subject to the
UCMJ may compel any
person to answer
incriminating questions. 
Art. 31(a) UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
831(a). 
Defendant may not be
compelled to give testimony
that is immaterial or
potentially degrading.  
Art. 31(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 831(c).
No adverse inference is to be
drawn from a defendant’s
refusal to answer any
questions or testify at court-
martial.  
Mil. R. Evid. 301(f).
Witnesses may not be
compelled to give testimony
that may be incriminating
unless granted immunity for
that testimony by a general
court-martial convening
authority, as authorized by the
Attorney General, if required.
18 U.S.C. § 6002; R.C.M.
704.
M.O. does not explicitly
address self-incrimination,
but art. 31, UCMJ mandates
that “no person subject to [the
UCMJ] may compel a person
to make a statement or
produce evidence before any
military tribunal if the
statement or evidence is not
material to the issue and may
tend to degrade him.”  
 Art. 31(c) UCMJ  (emphasis
added), 10 U.S.C. § 831.
Witnesses may not be
compelled to give testimony
that may be incriminating
unless given immunity for
that testimony.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (applicable
to any proceedings before an
executive department,
including the Department of
Defense or branch of the
Armed Services. 18 U.S.C. §
6001; 5 U.S.C. §§ 101-02)
“[T]he accused shall be
entitled … not to be
compelled to testify or to
confess guilt ….”




“[s]hall not be compelled to
incriminate himself or herself
or to confess guilt; [and s]hall
not be subjected to any form
of coercion, duress or threat,
to torture or to any other form
of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or
punishment; ....”
Rome Statute Art. 55.
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Right to Examine or
Have Examined
Adverse Witnesses 
“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the
right … to be confronted with
the witnesses against him;
….”
Amendment VI. 
Rules of Evidence prohibit
generally the introduction at
trial of statements made out of
court to prove the truth of the
matter stated unless the
declarant is available for
cross-examination at trial
(hearsay rule).  
Fed. R. Evid. 801 et seq.
The government is required to
disclose to defendant any
relevant evidence in its
possession or that may
become known through due
diligence.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
Hearsay rules apply as in
federal court. 
Mil. R. Evid. 801 et seq.  
In capital cases, sworn
depositions may not be used
in lieu of witness, unless
court-martial is treated as
non-capital or it is introduced
by the defense.
Art. 49, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
849.
Hearsay evidence admissible
if the commission determines
such evidence would “have
probative value to a
reasonable person.”
M.O. § 4(c)(3).
Art. 49(d), UCMJ, allowing
for duly authenticated
depositions to be read into
evidence in non-capital cases,
applies to military
commissions.
“[T]he accused shall be
entitled … to examine, or to
have examined … the
witnesses against him or her
….”





“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the
right … to have compulsory
process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, ….”
Amendment VI. 
Defendants have the right to
subpoena witnesses to testify
in their defense.  The court
may punish witnesses who fail
to appear.
Fed. R. Crim. Pro. Rule 17.
Defendants before court-
martial have the right to
compel appearance of
witnesses necessary to their
defense. 
R.C.M. 703.
Process to compel witnesses
in court-martial cases is to be
similar to the process used in
federal courts.
Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
846.
M.O. does not address
subpoenas.  Art. 46, UCMJ,
guarantees to all parties of
court-martial the opportunity
to obtain evidence and
witnesses, but empowers
military commissions as well
as courts-martial to hold
witnesses in contempt for
failure to appear.  
Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
846.
“…the accused shall be
entitled…to obtain the
attendance and examination
of witnesses on his or her
behalf…”
Rome Statute Art. 67(1)(e).
Right to Trial by
Impartial Judge
“The Judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in
The independence of the
judiciary from the other
branches was established to
A qualified military judge is
detailed to preside over the
court-martial.  The convening
M.O. does not expressly
provide for measures to
ensure impartiality of the
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...  inferior courts .... The
Judges ...  shall hold their
Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall receive
... a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in
Office.”
Article III § 1.
The Due Process clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires
trial by impartial judge.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927).





United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980).
Judges with a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of a
case  or other conflicts of
interest are disqualified and
must recuse themselves.
28 U.S.C. § 455.
authority may not prepare or
review any report concerning
the performance or
effectiveness of the military
judge.
Art. 26, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
826.
  Article 37, UCMJ, prohibits
unlawful influence of courts-
martial through
admonishment, censure, or
reprimand of its members by
the convening authority or
commanding officer, or any
unlawful attempt by a person
subject to the UCMJ to coerce
or influence the action of a
court-martial or convening
authority.
Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
837. 
members of tribunals.  Article
37, UCMJ applies to “other
military tribunals” as to the
prohibition of coercion or
unlawful influence by any
person subject to the UCMJ,
but does not appear to
prohibit admonishment,
censure, or reprimand of its
members by the convening
authority or commanding
officer.
Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
837. 
functions.”
Rome Statute Art. 40.
“A judge shall not participate
in any case in which his or
her impartiality might
reasonably be doubted on any
ground. A judge shall be
disqualified from a case ... if,
inter alia, that judge has
previously been involved in
any capacity in that case
before the Court or in a
related criminal case at the
national level involving the
person being investigated or
prosecuted ....”
Rome Statute Art. 41.
Right to Trial By
Impartial Jury 
“The Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; ....”
Art III § 2 cl. 3.
“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the
right to a ... trial, by an
impartial jury of the state ....”
Amendment VI. 
The pool from which juries
are drawn must represent a
fair cross section of the
community.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975).
There must further be
measures to ensure individual
jurors selected are not biased
(i.e., the voir dire process).  
Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370 (1892); see Fed. R.
A military accused has no
Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by petit jury.
 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
39-40 (1942) (dicta).
 However, “Congress has
provided for trial by members
at a court-martial.” 
United States v. Witham, 47
MJ 297, 301 (1997); Art. 25,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825.
Crimes against the law of war
are not required to be tried by
jury.
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942).
The Rome Statute follows the
civil law tradition of
employing a panel of judges
to decide questions of both
fact and law.  There is no
provision for trial by jury.
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Crim. P. 24 (peremptory
challenges).
The trial must be conducted
in a manner designed to avoid
exposure of the jury to
prejudicial material or undue
influence.
If the locality of the trial has
been so saturated with
publicity about a case that it is
impossible to assure jurors
will not be affected by
prejudice, the defendant is
entitled to a change of venue. 
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961).
The Sixth Amendment
requirement that the jury be
impartial applies to court-
martial members and covers
not only the selection of
individual jurors, but also
their conduct during the trial
proceedings and the
subsequent deliberations.
United States v. Lambert, 55
M.J. 293 (2001).
The absence of a right to trial
by jury precludes criminal
trial of civilians by court-
martial.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); Kinsella v. United






“The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety
may require it”
Article I § 9 cl. 2.
 Originally, the writ of habeas
corpus permitted collateral
attack upon a prisoner's
conviction only if the
sentencing court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. It
later evolved into an avenue
for the challenge of federal
and state convictions on other
due process grounds,  to
determine whether a
prisoner’s detention is
“contrary to the Constitution
or laws or  treaties of the
United States.”
The writ of habeas corpus
provides the primary means
by which those sentenced by
military court, having
exhausted military appeals,
can challenge a conviction or
sentence in a civilian court. 
The scope of matters that a
court will address is more
narrow than in challenges of
federal or state convictions.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137 (1953).
The language of the M.O.
appears to exclude review by
any civilian court.
 “[T]he individual shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy
or maintain any proceeding,
directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or
proceeding sought on the
individual's behalf, in (i) any
court of the United States, or
any State thereof, (ii) any
court of  any foreign nation,
or (iii) any international
tribunal.” 
The Rome Statute provides for
appeal of a conviction or
sentence to the Appeals
Chamber of the ICC at any
time after trial if new
evidence becomes available,
even after the accused’s death.
Rome Statute Art. 84.
 However, it does not
explicitly provide for appeal
to another international court
or the civilian courts of any
state.
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 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et seq. M.O. §7(b)(2).
Similar language was held not
to bar habeas corpus review
in ex parte Quirin, but habeas
corpus review was denied in
other most other cases tried by
military commissions, e.g.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950); In re
Application of Homma, 327
U.S. 759, 760 (1946); Ex






“Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines




The death penalty is not per
se unconstitutional, but its
discriminatory and arbitrary
imposition may be, and the
death penalty may not be
automatic.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); 18 U.S.C.§
3592 (mitigating /aggravating
circumstances).
When the death penalty may
be imposed, the defendant
shall be provided a list of
potential jurors and witnesses,
unless the court finds that
such action might jeopardize
the life or safety of any
person.
18 U.S.C. § 3432.
A special hearing is held to
Death may only be adjudged
for certain crimes where the
defendant is found guilty by
unanimous vote of court-
martial members present at
the time of the vote.  Prior to
arraignment, the trial counsel
must give the defense written
notice of aggravating factors
the prosecution intends to
prove.
R.C.M. 1004.
A conviction of spying during
time of war under article 106,
UCMJ, carries a mandatory
death penalty.




members present, a majority
of members being present. 
Sentences can include life
imprisonment or death.
M.O. § 4.
Charge of spying during time
of war under article 106,
UCMJ, is triable by military
commission and on conviction
carries a mandatory death
penalty.
10 U.S.C. § 906.
Aiding the enemy is also
triable by military
commission and may be
punished by death.
10 U.S.C. § 904.
Penalties are limited to
imprisonment, fines, and
forfeiture of assets; there is no
death penalty.
Rome Statute Art. 77.
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determine whether the death
sentence is warranted.
18 U.S.C. § 3593.
